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               The United States has, in essence, become the world’s borrower of last resort. 
                                                      —Martin Wolf, April 5, 2005 
 
 
I left the staff of the Federal Reserve in 1998, the year that the US current account deficit reached 
$210 billion—2.4 percent of GDP. The staff (Division of International Finance 1997) had concluded 
18 months earlier that the deficit was on an unsustainable trajectory. By the fourth quarter of 2004, 
the deficit had more than tripled in dollar terms to $740 billion. It was two and a half times larger as a 
percent of GDP—6.2 percent. What happened? 
  Martin Wolf’s statement provides a partial answer, “The United States has, in essence, 
become the world’s borrower of last resort.” However, he only describes the current reality. More 
important, the US current account deficit is an endogenous variable. It is affected by policies in the 
United States and the rest of the world, and it is affected by private agents’ economic and financial 
choices around the world. Consequently, one should not have much confidence in unconditional 
point forecasts for the US current account position several years out.  
We can be confident that the deficit will persist and perhaps expand in the absence of 
economic and financial pressures for adjustment. However, despite hand wringing and dire warnings 
from representatives of institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), occasional 
cautionary remarks by US and foreign officials, and G-7 calls for “vigorous action” to address global 
imbalances, the plain fact is that policymakers face few incentives to adjust their policies in directions 
that would be likely to influence decisively the US external deficit. Indeed, as Martin Wolf’s 
description suggests, most policymakers are very comfortable with the status quo.  
With few exceptions at the microeconomic level, the United States to date is content to go 
on consuming more than it is producing and borrowing from abroad to finance its consumption 
binge. Moreover, countries in the rest of the world are happy to continue to produce more than they 
consume, to sell the United States the excess goods and services, and to invest the net proceeds in 
international financial assets in the United States as well as the rest of the world. The principal reason 
is that the adjustment process, when it gets fully under way, is likely to be politically and economically 
painful, and possibly financially painful, in the United States as well as the rest of the world. 
Policymakers have low pain thresholds. This leads them to the Scarlet O’Hara approach to problems: 
  2Tomorrow is another day! Worry about your problems tomorrow, maybe they will go away, and 
demonstrably they are not urgent. 
  In this paper, first, I review the evidence that the US current account position is 
unsustainable, more so than it was eight years ago when the Federal Reserve staff study was 
completed. I conclude that precision on what would be a sustainable position is not possible, but 
policymakers in the United States and the rest of the world would be well advised to design their 
policies on the assumption that over the next three to five years the US current account deficit will 
narrow to about 3 percent of GDP. 
  Next, I sketch out the implications of such an external adjustment for the US economy. 
The growth of US domestic demand will slow by at least a percentage point from its recent rate. 
Most consumers will feel this effect. They will also suffer a substantial terms of trade loss. I estimate 
the combined adjustment burden at $2,350 per capita. If not handled properly, the actual and 
potential growth rate of real GDP will also slow. 
  I follow with a prescription for US economic policies: (1) decisive action on the US budget 
deficit sooner rather than later (a familiar call) and (2) decisive action by the Federal Reserve to 
address more squarely in words and deeds the balance between demand and supply and the need to 
slow the growth of domestic demand (a less often heard recommendation). 
  Turning to the rest of the world, I argue that the adjustment process will be diffused but 
not painless. I offer several alternative scenarios of exchange rate adjustments. None is particularly 
attractive, and none of them will be fully effective without supporting policy actions. As part of the 
adjustment, the global economy will lose the growth stimulus that the US economy has been 
supplying for more than a decade—1.7 percent of GDP for the past five years, or about 0.3 percent 
per year on average. More seriously, the stimulus will be replaced by a drag. This reversal is why 
policymakers in the rest of the world are also in denial. They are not designing their policies on the 
assumption that their countries will have to absorb a large US external adjustment. In the absence of 
parallel accommodative policies, the economic, financial and political risks and costs of the inevitable 
adjustment of global imbalances will be larger.  
Finally, I examine the interpretation of recent international capital flows and the role of 
foreign exchange market intervention. I argue that analysts overstress intervention’s role and the risks 
of reserve diversification. Nevertheless, I propose that the United States, the euro area, and Japan 
should actively encourage more transparent reporting on the currency composition of foreign 
exchange reserves. They should also act to promote the continuous diversification of substantial 
additions to international reserves as well as existing stocks. 
 
  3 
U.S. CURRENT ACCOUNT SUSTAINABILITY 
 
Almost everyone knows that the US current account position is unsustainable in the sense that it is 
unlikely to continue indefinitely at its current rate of near 6 percent of GDP. It is even less likely to 
continue to expand in the manner suggested in the extrapolations by Cline (forthcoming), Roubini 
and Setser (2004), and Mann (2004). With unchanged policies and exchange rates, Cline’s estimates 
imply a US current account deficit of about 8 percent by 2010, while the estimate of Roubini and 
Setser is 10 percent of GDP, and Mann’s is 12 percent of GDP. None of them argue that their 
extrapolations are forecasts of anything other than a gross international financial discontinuity. On 
the other hand, Debelle and Galati (2005) demonstrate how difficult it is to predict a turnaround in 
current account positions. 
Most observers—for example, Greenspan (2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, and 2005) and Kohn 
(2004, 2005)—accept the proposition that the US current account deficit will eventually and 
inevitably shrink. Although their pronouncements are subject to varying interpretations, both Kohn 
and Greenspan opine that the process of adjustment need not be disruptive to financial markets, 
which is a view supported by recent empirical work by Croke, Kamin, and Leduc (2005). However, 
Greenspan, Kohn, and Croke et al. fail to comment on the economic costs of the inevitable 
adjustment.  
Bernanke (2005), on the other hand, expresses little concern over the indefinite continuation 
of large US current account deficits, which he attributes primarily to an ex ante excess of global 
saving relative to attractive investment opportunities in the rest of the world. His analytical view is 
similar to Martin Wolf’s, except that Wolf expresses considerably more concern about the 
continuation of recent trends. Both views are the financial counterpart to what Mann has described 
as co-dependence and Summers (2004b) describes as “international vendor finance.”  
Ferguson (2005, 8) offers an elegant, model-based decomposition of the causes and 
consequences of the US current account deficit, but his diagnosis offers little guidance on how the 
deficit will be or should be reduced aside from an assertion that the implications “for US economic 
growth and inflation will most likely be benign.” Kohn (2005, 6) concludes, “In all likelihood, 
adjustments toward reduced imbalances in the United States and globally will be handled well by 
markets without, by themselves, disrupting the good overall performance of the US economy—
provided, of course, that the Federal Reserve reacts appropriately to foster price and economic 
stability.” He adds, “Still, complacency would be ill-advised.” 
Three factors help to explain this wide range of views about the US current account 
position. First, as noted, the US current account position is an endogenous variable. This 
  4characterization holds for most countries except in the limiting case in which a country completely 
loses access to international capital markets; at that point its current account surplus is the 
endogenous variable. In the US case, analyses of the sustainability of the US current account position 
sometimes focus on the source of the imbalance and the accompanying behavior of the US 
economy—for example, Summers (2004a and 2004b) and Roubini and Setser (2004). These 
judgmental analyses are not very illuminating because of difficulty in constructing the appropriate 
counterfactual. Even careful analysis such as in Ferguson raises more questions than it answers. For 
example, because of the use of uncovered interest parity to close the model, the Ferguson analysis 
adds substantially to the estimated contribution of slower growth in the rest of the world to the 
widening of the US current account deficit; the model associates higher growth with higher interest 
rates and currency appreciation. However, it is well known that there is essentially no empirical 
support for the theoretical construct of uncovered interest parity. 
Second, the US current account is not a target of US policy. Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and 
Garber (2003, 2004) characterize the current performance of the global economy as a return to 
Bretton Woods. Their analogy is flawed because it is incomplete and therefore does not offer a useful 
guide to analysis or policy (Truman 2005b). However, their musings contain a kernel of insight. 
Under the Bretton Woods international monetary system and its successor international financial 
system for more than three decades, the US dollar has been the nth currency in the system.1 
Consequently, the United States generally has been content to be, and generally has been encouraged 
by other countries to be, passive about the international value of the dollar and the stock and flow 
consequences of the evolution of our endogenous current account positions. On the rare occasions 
when the United States has had a view on its trade or current account balance—such as in 1971 with 
the Smithsonian Agreement and in 1985 with the Plaza Agreement—the consequences for the 
smooth functioning of the international financial system were somewhat problematic.  
Third, we lack consensus on the appropriate analytical framework to apply in thinking about 
a country’s current account position and how it adjusts. Four major analytical strands can be 
identified: 
  Trade balance view: A country’s current account position reflects the balance between 
exports of goods and services and imports plus the cost of servicing existing net 
                                                 
1     Some argue that this characterization and the related advocacy of benign neglect by certain US academics 
in the late 1960s principally applied only to the last 18 months of the Bretton Woods regime prior to the 
United States’ closing of the official gold window on August 15, 1971. See, for example, Williamson (1971). 
Historians can and do disagree. 
  5international debt and covering net transfer payments. This view focuses primarily on the 
determinants of exports and imports—economic activity, inflation rates, and exchange 
rates—with an emphasis generally on exchange rates. 
  Saving and investment view: A country’s current account position reflects the balance 
between domestic saving and investment. This view focuses on the determinants of 
domestic saving, in particular, fiscal positions, as well as the relative attractiveness of cross-
border investment opportunities. 
  Domestic demand view: A country’s current account position reflects the balance between 
total domestic demand, sometimes referred to as absorption, and output or domestic supply. 
This view focuses on policies that affect demand and supply—fiscal and monetary policies 
with respect to demand and structural policies with respect to supply. 
  Portfolio balance view: A country’s current account position reflects the balance between 
the net external demand for and supply of a country’s financial assets. This view, often 
referred to as the capital account view, focuses on relative ex ante rates of return, risk, and 
wealth allocation. 
 
All four strands of analysis are valid, in part because they focus either on accounting 
identities or equilibrium conditions. Thus they are all part of the same story. Any account of the 
evolution and adjustment of the US current account position must take account of all of these 
elements. A proper analysis does not focus only on economic activity, or exchange rates, or saving, 
or investment, or expected rates of return, or total domestic supply and demand; it incorporates all 
those factors. A focus on one element to the neglect of the others risks distorting the analysis at best 
and misleading policy at worst. 
Given the lack of consensus about what drives a country’s current account position, it is not 
surprising that one can find a range of views about what would be a sustainable US current account 
position. Table 1 summarizes six such views, presented as combinations of trend US current account 
positions (a flow) and accompanying trend levels of the US negative net international investment 
position (NIIP) (a stock) as a percent of GDP.2 It is useful to consider each view because doing so 
illuminates the potential US adjustment process. 
                                                 
 
2    The translation for most entries is accomplished by using the back-of-the-envelope condition that to 
stabilize the negative NIIP ratio to nominal GDP, the ratio of the current account deficit to nominal GDP 
must equal the growth rate of nominal GDP times the NIIP ratio and by an assumption that the trend rate 
of growth of US nominal GDP is 6 percent. The presentation in table 1 abstracts from the fact that if an 
adjustment of the US current account position were accompanied by a further substantial depreciation of 
  6First is the NIIP status quo. What would it imply for the US current account if the negative 
NIIP ratio were to be maintained at its value of 25 percent of GDP as of the end of 2003? The 
answer is that the current account deficit would have to average 1.5 percent of GDP. Since the 
deficit was 5.7 percent of GDP in 2004, it would have to spend a considerable period in surplus to 
maintain a 25 percent NIIP ratio. The trade balance would be roughly zero because net transfer 
payments are about 0.6 percent of GDP. In addition, the US NIIP consists disproportionately of 
interest-bearing, dollar-denominated liabilities. Those net liabilities were about $3.1 trillion at the end 
of 2003, compared with an overall NIIP of minus $2.7 trillion, with direct investment valued at the 
current stock market value of owners’ equity; they are predominantly short-term.3 At the abnormally 
low nominal dollar interest rates of recent years, these liabilities’ financial cost has been understated. 
At a more normal nominal short-term interest rate— say, 300 basis points higher than in late 2003 
and early 2004—the interest cost of the net interest-bearing, dollar-denominated liabilities and the 
US current account deficit would have been about 0.9 percent of GDP larger.4 Thus the combination 
of net income payments and net transfer payments would exhaust the current account deficit of 1.5 
percent of GDP. 
                                                                                                                                                 
the dollar there would be a one-time positive adjustment of the NIIP ratio, what the literature calls the 
valuation effect. The IMF (2004b, 16) has estimated that a 25 percent depreciation of the dollar reduces the 
US NIIP ratio by 7 percent of GDP. In their analysis of US current account adjustment, Blanchard, 
Giavazzi, and Sa (2005a and 2005b) integrate this phenomenon into their analysis along with the 
assumption not only of imperfect goods substitution (a common assumption in trade theory) but also of 
imperfect asset substitution (a common feature of portfolio balance models a generation ago, but not one 
that has been well supported in empirical work). See also Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005). As long as a 
major channel of current account adjustment is a substantial change in the US dollar’s effective exchange 
rate, this phenomenon alters the path of the current account associated with achieving a given assumed 
steady-state NIIP ratio. Since table 1 is a comparative-static exercise intended to illustrate the range of 
possible combinations of trend current account deficits and negative NIIP positions without focusing on 
the time paths associated with their achievement, ignoring this important effect does not distort the 
message in the table. One can reasonably presume that it will wash out over the adjustment period as 
current account deficits add to US net international debt. 
3    These figures are based on the preliminary estimates of the US NIIP as of the end of 2003. The revised 
estimates released on June 30, 2005, improved the 2003 NIIP by $279 billion to minus $2.4 trillion, or 21.6 
percent of GDP from 24.1 percent. The preliminary estimate of the US NIIP for the end of 2004 is minus 
$2.5 trillion, or a very small increase to 21.7 percent of GDP. Although net financial inflows of $585 billion 
were recorded during 2004, the increase in net liabilities was offset by the effects of the dollar’s depreciation 
and other price changes and adjustments to yield a net change in the US position of only $170 billion.  
4    O’Neill and Hatzius (2004) estimate that if US government bond yields rise to 6 percent, the average level 
of the 1990s, this would add 1.2 percentage points to the US current account deficit relative to GDP. 
Roubini and Setser (2004) argue that the abnormally low dollar interest rates may also have contributed to 
an unbalanced US recovery and expansion of the US economy in the direction of excessive housing 
investment. 
  7Second is the current account status quo (I) in percentage terms. What would it imply for the 
negative NIIP ratio if the current account deficit were to be maintained at 6 percent of GDP—
approximately the level in the second half of 2004 and the first half of 2005? The answer is that the 
NIIP ratio would rise to 100 percent of GDP. This would be an unprecedented level, but records are 
made to be broken.5  
Note, however, that holding the current account deficit at 6 percent of GDP would imply a 
continuing decline in the US trade deficit as a share of GDP. A larger and larger portion of the 
current account deficit would be devoted to debt service; servicing an additional 75 percent of GDP 
in NIIP at the average return on foreign assets in the United States in 2004 (3.6 percent) plus a 0.9 
percentage point interest adjustment reflecting more normal dollar interest rates (for a total of 4.5 
percent) implies an additional 3.4 percent of GDP in debt service.6 Including the 0.9 percent of GDP 
interest adjustment to the existing NIIP and taking account of the fact that US net transfer payments 
abroad are about 0.6 percent of GDP, the trade balance associated with a steady-state current 
account balance of 6 percent of GDP would be a deficit of about 1.5 percent of GDP—an 
adjustment of at least 5½ percentage points from the fourth quarter of 2004. 
Third is the current account status quo (II) in dollar terms. What would it take to maintain 
the US current account at its 2003 level of roughly $500 billion, a deficit that Cooper (2004) suggests 
should be of little concern? This would imply that the current account deficit would initially undergo 
a sharp contraction from the $753 billion at an annual rate in the fourth quarter of 2004 and then 
steadily decline as a percentage of GDP; the trade deficit would decline at a faster rate than the 
current account deficit. In addition, as shown in table 1, in Cooper’s analysis the negative NIIP ratio 
would peak in 2118 at 46 percent of GDP along with the current account deficit at 2.2 percent of 
GDP, and both would subsequently decline. In 2118 there would be a small trade surplus, and the 
trade account would progressively move into larger surplus as net debt was paid down as a 
percentage of GDP.7 This analysis implies substantial trade and current account adjustment, but one 
that is stretched over more than a decade. 
                                                 
5    Obtsfeld and Rogoff (2004) identify Ireland in 1983 as the record holder, with a net international financial 
position at 83 percent of GDP. On the other hand, the IMF reports that as of the end of 2004 New 
Zealand’s net external liabilities were 84.5 percent of GDP. 
6    By assuming that the interest rate on marginal US external debt (5.5 percent) is lower than the nominal 
growth rate of GDP (6 percent), we have a stable situation. 
7    The calculation assumes an interest rate of 4.5 percent on the net new debt, an adjustment of 0.9 percent of 
GDP on the old debt, and net transfer payments of 0.6 percent of GDP. 
  8Fourth is the productivity view. Under this view (see, for example, Rosenberg 2003), a 
continuation of the recent elevated growth of US productivity and the associated attractive rates of 
return on US physical assets, combined with the increased flexibility of financial markets emphasized 
by Greenspan, suggests that the US current account deficit in the near term need only narrow to 
about 4 percent of GDP, which would imply a negative NIIP ratio of 67 percent, close to Ireland’s 
1983 peak. There would be a small trade deficit.8 Thus an adjustment of the US current account 
balance is implied by this view, but it is relatively mild. However, Erceg (2002) usefully reminds us 
that in a general equilibrium context with intertemporal budget constraints, once the positive 
productivity shock has passed, a country needs to repay the external debt that it has accumulated to 
finance the associated investment, which means running a trade surplus. Thus this equilibrium, such as 
it is, would be temporary.9
Fifth is the global wealth view. This view involves stabilizing the share of net claims on the 
United States as a share of global wealth (Mann 2003). The trend current account and negative NIIP 
ratios are lower than under the productivity view, at 3.0 and 50 percent of GDP, respectively, 
implying a bit more adjustment and a trade deficit a bit closer to zero.10
Sixth is the zero trade deficit view. This view applies the logic of primary deficits and 
surpluses; net lending to the United States on average would be limited to the amount sufficient to 
cover the US net income payments and net transfer payments. The associated NIIP ratio could be 
anything. If we assume (1) it was 40 percent, (2) the marginal cost of servicing the additional net debt 
of 15 percent of GDP is 4.5 percent, (3) a one-time 0.9 percent of GDP adjustment to the net cost 
of servicing the existing NIIP, and (4) net transfers of 0.6 percent of GDP, then the resulting implied 
trend current account deficit would be 2.2 percent of GDP. Note, however, that under this view, the 
entire US deficit on trade in goods and services as of the fourth quarter of 2004 ( 5.6 percent of 
GDP) would be eliminated. 
The range of views summarized in table 1 suggests a great deal of uncertainty about the size, 
as well as the timing, of US current account adjustment. However, the current account deficit will not 
expand without limit even if we do not have great confidence about what the limit is. In other words, 
the current-conditions-unchanged trajectories for the US current account through 2010 postulated by 
                                                 
8     See footnote 7. 
9     A related framework with a deeper theoretical foundation involves intertemporal consumption smoothing 
(Sachs 1982, Razin 1994, and Obstfeld and Rogoff 1995). This framework yields somewhat more benign 
welfare implications but has little empirical support, and as Debelle and Galati (2005) point out, it is not 
well suited for assessing issues of sustainability. 
10    See footnote 7. 
  9Cline (2005), Roubini and Setser (2004), and Mann (2004) are almost certainly not going to 
materialize, and these authors make no claim that they will. Some adjustment would be required even 
for the current account status quo to be maintained. Moreover, doing so as the negative NIIP 
expands, in turn, implies more adjustment down the road. In all cases the trade balance moves 
substantially toward surplus or is eliminated. Finally, if the implied trend negative NIIP ratio appears 
to be implausible, then more substantial adjustment will occur. 
Under these circumstances it would be prudent if policymakers assumed that the size of the 
eventual adjustment in the US current account position is likely to be associated with a deficit of 
about 3 percentage points of US GDP. Moreover, the adjustment process, once it gets fully under 
way, is likely to overshoot, which is particularly relevant for near-term economic policy 
considerations. 
I now turn to the implications of this inevitable process of adjustment for the US economy 
and US economic policy and for the economies of the rest of the world and economic policies 
outside the United States. 
 
IMPLICATIONS OF EXTERNAL ADJUSTMENT FOR THE U.S. ECONOMY 
 
A continuation of ultimately unsustainable US current account deficits points to potential domestic 
as well as global economic, financial, and political consequences. Globally, one risk is a rise in 
protectionism, which imposes long-run costs on both the United States and the global economy. 
Other geopolitical implications are also relevant. Summers (2004b) refers to the “balance of financial 
terror” associated with large, concentrated official holdings of short-term, dollar-denominated claims 
on the United States. More generally, countries that are large international debtors find it more of a 
challenge to exert leadership in political as well as economic spheres. This challenge is complicated, 
on balance, though some say ameliorated, by the fact that the dollar is an international currency. It is 
an international currency in the sense that residents of other countries widely use it as a unit of 
account, a means of payment, and a store of value in circumstances in which US residents are not 
involved.11
  Again, many of these concerns and considerations do not relate to the US current account 
deficit per se but to the process of correction once it is under way. Under these circumstances, the 
                                                 
11   This aspect of the dollar’s role is more relevant and complicating to the exercise of US monetary policy than 
the dollar’s limited reserve role because of the high degree of inertia in official reserve holdings; see Truman 
(2005a) and below. 
  10coexistence of an external and a fiscal deficit, even if the two are not “twins,” increases the risks. 
Gramlich (2004) introduces the concept of a “credibility range” applying to fiscal and external 
deficits in which neither type of deficit has large effects on asset prices—interest rates or exchange 
rates. Extending his concept, when either deficit is large or has been expanding, the credibility ranges 
narrow for both deficits. Confidence in US financial policy is undermined (Truman 2001), and the 
risk of crisis rises.  
Rubin, Orszag, and Sinai (2004) vividly describe a number of adverse scenarios, implicitly 
disagreeing with Greenspan (2004a), who sees greater financial market flexibility as reducing the risk 
of crisis. Freund (2000) in her study of the experiences of industrial countries with large current 
account adjustments brings out a key point: External financial crises are much more common after 
the process of adjustment is under way than as a trigger to the adjustment process.12 Croke, Kamin, 
and Leduc (2005), in their updating of Freund’s analysis, find more limited evidence of the 
“disorderly correction” of external imbalances in industrial countries. Their analysis focuses on 
developments in financial markets and is reassuring in that it suggests that the probability of a 
disorderly correction is low, but it does not preclude the possibility. Moreover, they find that a 
disorderly adjustment associated with substantial exchange rate depreciation is more likely in the case 
where GDP growth is high and rising. See also Debelle and Galati (2005), who emphasize differences 
between the loose patterns of current account adjustment in other industrial countries and the 
pattern observed in the United States in the late 1980s: Exchange rates played a larger role, growth 
played a smaller role, and the ratio of net foreign liabilities to GDP did not change, in large part 
because compared with other countries US external liabilities are predominantly denominated in 
dollars. Finally, Lane and Milesi-Feretti (2005) present a detailed analysis that concludes that the 
United States is more dependent on capital inflows than is implied by the rosy 
Greenspan/Bernanke/Ferguson analysis. Lane and Milesi-Feretti (2005, 17) summarize their results: 
“At some point, the vision of the US as a safe haven and natural home for liquid holdings will be 
undercut by persistent portfolio losses induced by an depreciating currency and/or investors will 
begin to require more significant risk premia on US-issued liabilities.”  
Turning to the domestic economic implications of a continuation of large US current  
account deficits, analysis is complicated by the fact that the implications in size and, occasionally, in 
sign depend upon the circumstances in which the deficits developed as well as economic and 
                                                 
12   Of the 25 episodes Freund reviews, using a modified Frankel and Rose (1996) index approach, 17 involved 
external financial crises, but only 4 occurred before the current account deficit reached its widest point. 
  11financial conditions in the US and global economy. The effects can be viewed as either positive or 
negative in both the short and longer runs.13
  For example, in the short run, a widening of the US current deficit associated with slower 
growth abroad is associated with downward pressure on US economic activity and employment, 
which may or may not be welcome, depending on the condition of the domestic economy. At full 
employment, the external deficit allows domestic demand to exceed supply, permitting an increase in 
domestic consumption and/or investment. To the extent that the dollar appreciates as part of the 
process, the positive terms-of-trade effect also boosts welfare in terms of the real value of 
consumption.  
  In the medium or longer run, the appropriate conditioning assumption is that the economy 
is at full employment. In this context, US current account deficits have both positive and negative 
effects, depending in part on the nature of the comparison. On the positive side, domestic demand 
exceeds supply, the country is permitted temporarily to live beyond its means, consumption (private 
and public) is higher than it otherwise would be, and investment is higher as well. In addition, the 
dollar normally appreciates relative to where it would be without the deficit, which provides a 
positive terms-of-trade effect. As noted by Paul A. Volcker (2005a), “There is no sense of strain. . . . 
It’s all quite comfortable for us.” With little or no pain or strain, what is there to worry about? 
On the negative side, the costs are all in the future. The United States is borrowing from 
abroad, which presumptively depresses the US standard of living in the future compared with a 
situation with a lower deficit in the near term. Even if the current account deficit permits a higher 
level of investment, the direct returns on that investment flow abroad. The level and growth rate of 
GNP (GDP less net income payments abroad) are lower compared with a situation in which the 
same rate of domestic investment occurred without the current account deficit.14  
  In popular and political discussions, correction of the US external deficit often is associated 
with a boost to US employment and output. What this view ignores is that normally the economy 
should be operating close to full employment.15 Thus a reduction in the external deficit, with 
production (GDP) or total domestic supply unchanged, means gross domestic purchases (absorption, 
                                                 
13   Ferguson (2005) offers an excellent example of this type of analysis. 
14   A theoretical exception to this generalization involves the intertemporal consumption-smoothing view 
described in footnote 8. At the other extreme of rationality, we have myopia. 
15   Of course, deficits are likely to affect the distribution of employment and capacity utilization across sectors, 
with possible economic and obvious political implications. 
  12or GDP less net exports) or total domestic demand must be reduced; the United States must stop or 
curtail living beyond its means.  
To illustrate this point, if the US trade and current account deficits have to be reduced by 3 
percent of GDP ($375 billion), then gross domestic purchases will be reduced by about $1,350 per 
capita at an unchanged level of real GDP.16 On top of this adjustment, there would be a terms-of-
trade loss. If we assume that an adjustment of the US current account deficit by 3 percent of GDP is 
accompanied by at least a 30 percent nominal effective depreciation of the dollar, we can estimate the 
associated terms-of-trade loss at an additional $1,000 per capita.17  
However, as noted earlier, external adjustment is not just about the effects of exchange rates 
on exports, imports, and trade balances. It is also about slowing the rate of growth of domestic 
demand (gross domestic purchases) relative to the growth of production (GDP). To achieve any 
adjustment of the imbalance in real terms as a share of GDP, the growth rate of the former must be 
less than the growth rate of the latter.  
Macroeconomic Advisors (2005) has recently produced a useful scenario for adjustment on 
this scale in the form of a long-term forecast through 2014, by which time the US current account 
deficit is projected to reach 2.9 percent of GDP.18 Under this scenario, the growth rate of real GDP 
from 2004 to 2014 averages 3.2 percent per year, essentially the same as the 3.3 percent growth rate 
from 1994 to 2004. At the same time, the growth rate of real gross domestic purchases (domestic 
demand) averages only 2.6 percent per year from 2004 to 2014 compared with 3.7 percent from 1994 
to 2004—a reduction of more than one percentage point from recent experience.  
If the adjustment of the US current account deficit to 3 percent of GDP were to occur over 
half a decade rather than over a full decade, the slowdown in the growth rate of real domestic 
demand would be sharper, closer to 2 percentage points per year to 1.5 percent for five years. If the 
adjustment were delayed, and meanwhile the US current account deficit continued to widen, the 
eventual slowdown in the growth of domestic demand would be extended.  
                                                 
16   This calculation is based on an estimate of US gross domestic purchases of $13.1 trillion in 2005 and a US 
population of 294 million. 
17   This calculation is based on estimated US imports of goods and services of $2 trillion in 2005 and the 
assumption that the pass-through from dollar depreciation to import prices is 50 percent, with no effect on 
export prices. 
18   The forecast assumes a further 21 percent depreciation of the Federal Reserve Board staff’s measure of the 
broad trade-weighted foreign exchange value of the dollar—two-thirds of which would occur before 2010. 
It is also based on the assumption that the US unified budget deficit on a fiscal year basis declines from 3.5 
percent of GDP in 2004 to 2.2 percent in 2009 and 0.3 percent in 2014. This decline has the effect of 
limiting upward pressure on US interest rates—the peak for the 10-year note is 5.72 in 2007 and 2008—
even as the nominal trade deficit is cut in half and the real trade balance moves into a small surplus. 
  13Moreover, the larger and the more compressed the adjustment, the higher would be the 
probability of a pronounced slowdown, not only in the growth of domestic demand but also in the 
growth of domestic output—real GDP. In 1987, US net exports reached a low at minus 3 percent of 
GDP before rising over the next four years to minus 0.3 percent of GDP in 1991. Over the four 
years ending in 1987, US real GDP expanded at an average annual rate of 4.5 percent, while real 
domestic demand expanded at 4.9 percent. Over the following four years, real GDP expanded only 
2.25 percent per year, while real domestic demand increased only 1.6 percent. Of course, 1991 was a 
recession year, and one can debate whether the external adjustment process contributed to that 
recession, but the point is that one cannot exclude the possibility that the process of US external 
adjustment will entail a slowdown in the growth of actual output to below the growth of potential 
output along with the essential slowdown in the growth of domestic demand.19
US external adjustment will require in addition an adjustment of US saving and investment. 
In the absence of a boost in US domestic saving, for example, brought about by the type of favorable 
fiscal adjustment posited by Macroeconomic Advisors, the effects on US interest rates of a reduced 
net inflow of savings from abroad are comparable to the effects of the US fiscal deficit on interest 
rates. Such estimates vary, but a representative recent study by Laubach (2003) found that the US 
long-term treasury rate is reduced by about 25 basis points for each 1 percent of GDP reduction in 
the fiscal deficit. Thus, all else equal and as a first approximation, a reduction in the US current 
account deficit by 3 percent of GDP would boost expected US long-term interest rates by 75 basis 
points. This, in turn, would reduce the rate of investment, lower the rate of growth of the capital 
stock, and slow the growth rate of potential GDP by two or three tenths compared with the average 
of about 3.0 percent that underlies the forecast by Macroeconomic Advisors. 
Thus it is not surprising that most US politicians and policymakers are not falling all over 
themselves to embrace early adjustment of US external accounts. Even if the growth rate of potential 
output is maintained at a high rate at or above 3 percent, the external adjustment when it comes at 
best will imply a downward adjustment of about a full percentage point per year, and perhaps more, 
in the growth rate of domestic demand for an extended period. Adverse movements in the terms of 
trade will be an additional drag on standards of living in the United States.  
                                                 
19   Using three-year comparisons, US real GDP increased at an annual rate of 3.5 percent from 1985 to 1987, 
while real domestic demand increased at a rate of 3.6 percent. (The growth rate of real domestic demand in 
1987 was 3.1 percent compared with the growth rate of real GDP of 3.4 percent, even though the trade and 
current account deficits widened that year.) From 1988 to 1990, real GDP increased at an average annual 
rate of 3.2 percent, and real domestic demand increased at 2.5 percent. 
  14It has become popular to bemoan the slowdown in the growth rate of real wages in recent 
years and their absolute decline in 2004. This is not the place to examine the issue of whether the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics series for real wages of hourly earnings of production and nonsupervisory 
workers on private, nonfarm payrolls adjusted by the CPI is the best measure of real wages, but the 
series, shown by the thick line in figure 1, shows a steady rise from 1994 to 2003. What is interesting 
is that declining real wages have been associated with improvement in the trade balance—net exports 
of goods and services. Improvement in net exports has followed, with a lag, dollar weakness. See the 
pattern from the mid-1980s, and the dollar’s previous peak, to the mid-1990s. This suggests that the 
United States, having lived well beyond its means since the late-1990s, faces an extended period of 
stagnation of real incomes. 
 
IMPLICATIONS OF EXTERNAL ADJUSTMENT FOR U.S. ECONOMIC POLICIES 
 
This section considers the implications of US external adjustment for three US economic policies: 
exchange rate, fiscal, and monetary policy. 
 
Exchange Rate Policy 
 
What about US exchange rate policy? Should the United States deliberately seek to weaken the 
dollar? No. The United States should have learned in the late 1970s that it could not devalue its way 
to prosperity, even if the United States and its major trading partners could successfully manipulate 
dollar exchange rates for an extended period via sterilized foreign exchange market intervention, 
which is not possible. See Truman (2003) for a commentary on the limited effectiveness of sterilized 
foreign exchange market intervention. A different question is whether the United States should 
discourage other countries from manipulating or pegging their bilateral dollar exchange rates when 




From the standpoint of sustaining US prosperity, the core economic policy issue today is the low rate 
of net domestic saving (figure 2A). As stated by Summers (2004a, 2), “I am reluctantly convinced 
that the most serious problem we have faced in the last 50 years is that of low national saving, 
resulting dependence on foreign capital, and fiscal sustainability, which has far-reaching implications 
for the US and the global economy.”  
  15Some economists think that the answer to sustaining US growth is to attract even more 
saving from abroad, but that offers only a short-run fix. Other economists believe that changes in the 
tax code will boost net private saving (see figure 2B). Normally they propose tax reductions, but 
some observers also advocate removal of the tax deductibility of mortgage interest payments. My 
impression is that there are fewer economists with these views than there once were. Most 
economists agree that the most reliable, but less than foolproof, method of increasing national saving 
is to reduce the fiscal deficit, move it into surplus, and raise net government saving, either by 
expenditure reductions, tax increases, or both. The short-run impact on the economy may be to slow 
growth, if monetary policy is unable to compensate fully, but the long-run impact will be to raise 
growth and living standards.  
Reducing the budget deficit should contribute to lower interest rates and may be associated 
with a weaker currency, which would tend to narrow the current account deficit and offset some of 
the short-term drag of fiscal policy. At the same time, as is recognized in the official statements of 
the US administration, action on the US budget deficit will help to maintain confidence in US 
economic policy. This confidence building should reduce the risk of a disruptive run on the dollar.  
Unfortunately, we do not have much evidence of decisive action on the US fiscal deficit. The 
proper measure is not the actual deficit, which has been declining somewhat as a share of GDP, but 
the structural deficit. On this measure, the IMF World Economic Outlook (2005) records a deterioration 
of 4.2 percentage points in the US general government structural balance as a percentage of potential 
GDP, from a surplus of 0.5 percent in 2000 to a deficit of 3.7 percent in 2003, with no improvement 
projected through 2006, when the deficit is pegged at 3.9 percent of GDP in the absence of a specific 
US budget consolidation program. In contrast, the US administration has set a target for the actual 




What about Federal Reserve policy? The Federal Reserve deserves high marks for pointing out, going 
back to the late 1990s, that the US external deficit is on an unsustainable trajectory and for its many 
frequent internal and publicly available analyses of the issues involved. On the other hand, too many 
Federal Reserve officials are interpreted as being cheerleaders for the view that the adjustment 
process, when it comes, will be smooth, rather than warning that the process might well be disruptive 
and unpleasant. Geithner (2005) and Gramlich (2004) have articulated more cautious views. Even if 
one has considerable confidence that adjustment is likely to be smooth, which I do, it is another 
matter to assert that it will be. Moreover, as demonstrated above, even smooth adjustment inevitably 
will be economically painful. Overconfidence can undermine the credibility of monetary policy. 
  16Most important, the Federal Reserve’s record in pointing out what should be done, aside 
from boosting domestic saving though less profligate fiscal policy, has been weak. The Federal Open 
Market Committee (FOMC 2004) concluded, “Members of the Committee noted that monetary 
policy was not well equipped to promote the adjustment of external imbalances but could best 
contribute to maintaining an environment of price stability that would foster maximum sustainable 
economic growth. Fiscal policy had a potentially larger role to play by promoting an increase in 
national saving, but the adjustment would involve shifts in demand and output both domestically and 
abroad, and changes in fiscal policy would not be sufficient to foster the adjustment.” The second 
sentence identifies a role for fiscal policy and implies that exchange rate adjustments will be part of 
the process. What the Federal Reserve has not acknowledged is that monetary policy has a role to 
play in slowing the growth of total domestic demand relative to the growth of total domestic supply 
or domestic output. The issue of concern is not just the effects of external adjustment on financial 
markets, but also on the real economy. It is one thing for politicians to be reluctant to acknowledge 
the real economic costs of external adjustment. The Federal Reserve does not have that excuse. 
The majority of the members of the FOMC apparently do not embrace the view that they 
should pay more attention to total domestic demand. They are mistaken. Monetary policy is not just 
about managing domestic output and employment; it is also about managing total domestic demand, 
and most importantly managing the balance between demand and output. The view that net exports 
are a “drag” on GDP rests on knee-jerk arithmetic analysis. Exports and imports of goods and 
services are jointly determined with consumption, investment, and many other macroeconomic 
variables. Moreover, policy should focus significant attention on total domestic demand. In 
particular, the Federal Reserve should ponder whether it is not unnatural to continue to stoke the 
furnace of domestic demand three years after the dollar has begun to weaken, the US economy has 
moved into an expansion phase, and the US external deficit has widened. It was wrong for Mexico to 
ignore the message for monetary policy from the foreign exchange markets in 1994 and for Thailand 
to do so in 1996. Is it wise for the Federal Reserve to do so in 2005? 
A failure to anticipate the need to manage demand as well as supply could well require the 
Federal Reserve to slam on the breaks, slowing the growth of domestic supply as well as demand in 
the name of containing inflation and restoring damaged Federal Reserve credibility. Some argue that 
a more rapid removal of the considerable monetary accommodation that is still a prominent feature 
of the US economy would slow down the external adjustment process via dollar appreciation. In 
response, I would point out that there is no empirical evidence of which I am aware that changes in 
relative short-term interest rates are systematically correlated with changes in exchange rates. 
A more subtle argument is that a focus on total domestic demand would be inconsistent 
with the Federal Reserve’s mandate to seek full employment and price stability. In this view, focusing 
  17on total domestic demand would be analogous to focusing on asset prices. Three counterarguments 
are relevant: (1) The effects of monetary policy on demand are well known; the effects of monetary 
policy on asset prices are highly uncertain. (2) The Federal Reserve has rationalized its dominant 
focus on price stability by arguing that doing so maximizes the potential rate of employment. The 
same can be said for achieving smooth adjustment of the real economy to an external imbalance. (3) 
The issue is one of timing. The Federal Reserve does not seek to achieve full employment at every 
point in time or to narrow the gap between actual and potential output as rapidly as possible. To do 
so would ensure overshooting by the real economy and higher inflation and lower output down the 
road. In the context of the inevitable external adjustment and the need to slow domestic demand 
relative to output, which the Federal Reserve accepts, the FOMC should examine more deeply the 
implications for output down the road of a delay in slowing domestic demand. 
 
IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. EXTERNAL ADJUSTMENT FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY 
 
The US current account deficit has been expanding for more than a decade, providing a net stimulus 
to the rest of the world. In the late 1990s, this phenomenon of co-dependency was healthy for both 
the US and the global economy. The United States was able to finance an investment boom, even 
though some of that investment was not as productive as had been anticipated. At the same time, the 
US expansion helped to cushion a global economic slowdown associated with the Asian financial 
crisis and the other crises that followed. To put this in context, the expansion of the US current 
account deficit from 1999 (after the Asian crisis was over) to 2004 contributed about 1.7 percent to 
GDP in the rest of the world, roughly 0.3 percent per year on average. It is therefore not surprising 
that policymakers in the rest of the world are ambivalent about US external adjustment. They are 
fearful that the adjustment process may be painful and that their economies will be affected 
disproportionately. The economic stimulus associated with the United States living beyond its means 
is welcome while it lasts. 
Table 2 presents data on the current account positions of 26 major US trading partners in 
1999 and 2004, along with the change between those two years and the distribution of that change as 
a percentage of the contemporaneous change in the US current account deficit. As you can see, 25 
percent of the counterpart of the deterioration in the US deficit can be found in other industrial 
countries, with Japan absorbing more than half of that share. About 24 percent can be found in non-
Japan Asia, with China accounting for more than half of that share. About 19 percent can be found 
in Latin America, and 24 percent in the rest of the world, principally Russia and Saudi Arabia, 
associated with the elevated oil prices compared with 1999. 
  18The US economy is about one quarter of the world economy at current exchange rates. If we 
assume that the US current account deficit will be cut in half over the next three to five years by 
about 3 percent of US GDP, this implies an offsetting adjustment of about 1 percent of output in the 
rest of the world on average. The era of co-dependency not only will come to an end, but it will be 
reversed. The United States will have to reduce its dependence on a net inflow of saving from 
abroad, and the rest of the world will have to stop depending on expanding net exports to the United 
States to stimulate growth. 
Arguably the process of US external adjustment has been under way for several years, since 
the dollar’s peak in February 2002. Over the subsequent three years, through March 2005, the dollar 
depreciated by about 15 percent on average in terms of the currencies of 26 US trading partners 
based on the Federal Reserve Board staff’s nominal, broad trade-weighted index of the foreign 
exchange value of the dollar.20 However, as can be seen from table 3, the resulting 18 percent 
appreciation of other currencies on average against the dollar has been concentrated in the industrial 
countries, with the prominent exception of the Korean won. The currencies in most of the rest of 
Asia and other parts of the developing world have appreciated only modestly or depreciated, with the 
consequence that those countries’ real effective exchange rates have generally depreciated.21
Notwithstanding the dollar’s depreciation over the past three years, the US external deficit 
has continued to widen. This is not because exchange rate changes have suddenly become ineffective 
in influencing trade patterns, because of so-called J-curves and delayed adjustment, or because of 
reduced pass-through of changes in exchange rates into import and other prices. I am skeptical that 
the empirical finding of reduced pass-through to import prices (see Marazzi, Sheets, Vigfusson et al. 
2005) tells the full story. We are observing ex post combinations of prices and quantities, and it is 
well known from international trade theory that quantities can change without price changes.  
The principal explanation for the lack of US external adjustment is that US domestic 
demand has continued to expand at a rapid rate, which has more than offset the influence of 
exchange rate changes. For example, although euro area policymakers periodically speak out against 
the brutal 50 percent appreciation of the euro against the dollar, the simple fact is that the impact on 
their economy so far has been limited. Over the past three years, euro area exports to the United 
                                                 
20   The real depreciation was less than a percentage point smaller. 
21   The only exceptions are Indonesia and Russia, with their higher-than-average inflation rates, which have 
contributed to real appreciation, and Chile. It is also noteworthy that Japan has experienced very little real 
effective appreciation of its currency, in part because of its deflation. In addition, the United Kingdom had 
a slight real depreciation; sterling’s strength against the dollar has been more than offset by its weakness 
against the euro. 
  19States as well as to the world have continued to expand at double-digit rates, even though the US 
share of overall exports has declined by about three-quarters of a percentage point; the US share of 
overall imports has risen by about 2 percentage points. Europe as a whole has yet to feel substantial 
pain from US external adjustment because there hasn’t been much pain. No doubt there have been 
some distributional effects associated with the euro’s appreciation against the dollar and other 
currencies linked to the dollar. The effects of appreciation have not been spread evenly over the euro 
area, which in effect has been hit by an asymmetric supply shock. 
To blunt the exchange rate appreciation and the adverse effects on their trade balances, 
some countries have in recent years engaged in large foreign exchange market interventions, which 
may, on average, have slowed the dollar’s decline somewhat over the past three years and certainly 
have distorted that decline. By the end of 2001, few countries, outside of those in Latin America, 
could credibly argue that their intervention operations were defensive, in the sense that they were 
motivated by a perceived need to build up a war chest of foreign exchange reserves. Nevertheless, in 
Japan and the rest of Asia, foreign exchange reserves have increased by more than 100 percent on 
average over the past three years. 
Table 4 presents data on the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves by selected countries 
and groups of countries from the end of 2001 until the end of 2004 as reported in the IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics. Out of a total reserve accumulation over three years of $1.4 trillion, 
Japan alone accounted for about 31 percent and was the only industrial country with any significant 
reserve increase.22 Non-Japan Asia accounts for about 57 percent, but only half of that percentage 
was China’s.23 The rest of the world accounted for about 11 percent. Nine of the 26 countries listed 
in table 4 experienced increases in their foreign exchange reserves of greater than or close to 100 
percent over the past three years. Special factors explain some of the increases, such as the rise in 
petroleum prices in the cases of Venezuela and Russia and the fact that Australia’s increase was from 
a quite low level and in the context of the largest bilateral appreciation against the dollar and real 
effective appreciation shown in table 3. I return below to the issue of foreign exchange market 
intervention and its role in the adjustment process.  
 
                                                 
22  Other industrial countries continued to accumulate interest on their reserves, and a few (Switzerland and the 
United Kingdom) added to their foreign exchange reserves via gold sales. 
23   Table 4 slightly understates China’s foreign exchange accumulation because the data from International 
Financial Statistics exclude the $45 billion in increased reserves transferred in late 2003 to support China’s 
banks. 
  20IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMIC POLICIES IN THE REST OF THE WORLD 
 
This section considers three issues. First, the implications of global adjustment for exchange rates are 
examined. Second, implications for financial markets of large-scale official intervention and reserve 
diversification are considered. Finally, I touch briefly on other economic policies in the rest of the 




If the US external deficit has to contract by about 3 percentage points of GDP, about $375 billion as 
of 2005, and if we accept the rule of thumb that a real depreciation of 1 percent on the Federal 
Reserve Board staff’s broad index of the foreign exchange value of the dollar will be associated with 
$10 billion in current account adjustment, then the dollar’s eventual cumulative adjustment will have 
to be at least 30 percent.24 However, exchange rate adjustments will be only part of the story.  
To bring about a substantial adjustment of the US external deficit on the order of 3 
percentage points of GDP will require not only market forces operating on exchange rates but other 
policy adjustments as well, not only in the United States, but also in the rest of the world. 
Nevertheless, it is useful to start with exchange rates because they are likely to be a central element of 
the process, ultimately forcing other policy adjustments. 
As part of global adjustment, the US dollar will almost certainly depreciate by another 20 
percent on average in nominal terms, in addition to the depreciation that has already occurred. This 
would produce somewhat more than the 30 percent real depreciation hypothesized above, but the 
illustrative figure allows for some degree of nominal depreciation in excess of real depreciation as 
                                                 
24   This rule of thumb is sometimes presented in the form that a 10 percent real effective depreciation of the 
dollar produces a correction of the US current account deficit of 1 percent of GDP. These rules of thumb 
assume the dollar’s adjustment is exogenous, which does not fully capture exchange market developments 
since early 2002. Moreover, different models yield different rules, and the results depend on assumptions 
about accompanying policies and objectives. Baily (2003) reports simulations of the effects of exogenous 
dollar depreciation in the Macroeconomic Advisors model; the results can be interpreted as implying a rule 
of thumb of about $20 billion per percentage point of dollar adjustment; US real GDP also declines relative 
to baseline. On the other hand, in FRB/Global (Levin, Rogers, and Tryon 1997), exogenous dollar 
depreciation produces about $6 billion per percentage point when monetary policies in the United States 
and abroad follow Taylor rules; in the United States, real GDP rises relative to baseline. If US and foreign 
real GDP were unchanged, the FRB/Global result would be closer to $10 billion per percentage point. On 
the other hand, Blanchard, Giavazzi, and Sa (2005a and 2005b) develop a rule of thumb that an adjustment 
of 1 percent of GDP requires an effective depreciation of the dollar of 15 percent. 
  21well as for some overshooting.25 Table 5 presents three scenarios that might be associated with a 
further 20 percent depreciation of the dollar, which translates into a 25 percent average appreciation 
of the relevant foreign currencies. The scenarios are constructed using the trade weights in the 
Federal Reserve Board staff’s broad index for the foreign exchange value of the US dollar shown in 
the table. 
Scenario 1 involves more of the same, with 25 percent nominal appreciations of the 
currencies of the other industrial countries with the exception of the euro; for example, the yen 
would appreciate to 84 per dollar. The scenario assumes that the euro will appreciate by enough to 
compensate for the nonparticipation by the currencies of developing countries, which make up 44 
percent of the index. As a result, the euro would appreciate by an additional 84 percent against the 
dollar—to about $2.40 per euro.  
  Scenario 2 involves some participation by the developing countries but smaller 
appreciations on average than for the industrial countries. Consequently, the residual appreciation of 
the euro is reduced to 42 percent against the dollar—to about $1.85 per euro. 
  Scenario 3 involves less than proportionate appreciations against the dollar by the 
currencies of the industrial countries—the yen only appreciates to 88 per dollar—the same sized 
appreciations of the currencies in Latin America and developing countries outside of Asia (Israel, 
Saudi Arabia, and Russia) as in scenario 2, with the residual amount being absorbed by Asian 
currencies on average, yielding a 41 percent appreciation against the dollar—to about RMB 5.91 per 
dollar compared with today’s 8.28. The fact that an appreciation of the Chinese yuan by this amount 
appears to be implausible is counterbalanced by the fact that the assumed 20 percent further 
appreciation of the euro would take that rate to $1.56 per euro. 
  These three scenarios underscore two points: First, if the dollar depreciates a further 20 
percent on average, the depreciation will have to be broadly based. Second, few of the currencies 
included in the Federal Reserve Board staff’s index will have much basis for avoiding an appreciation 
of at least 15 percent.  
On the other hand, the effective appreciations need not be so large. Table 6 presents the 
results of the scenarios in table 5 translated into percentage changes in effective exchange rates, 
based on the weights and methodology used by Citigroup. Those weights and methods are close to 
those used at the Federal Reserve.26 Under the extreme assumptions of scenario 1, the 84 percent 
                                                 
 
25   Twenty percent is also comparable with Macroeconomic Advisor’s scenario, described above. 
26   In constructing these effective exchange rates, we considered only the 26 currencies included in the Federal 
Reserve Board staff’s index. On average these 26 countries and the United States accounted for 93 percent 
  22appreciation of the euro against the US dollar translates into an effective appreciation of the euro of 
68 percent, in addition to the 24 percent real appreciation seen since February 2002 (table 3). In 
scenario 2, the euro’s effective appreciation is reduced to 21 percent, a bit less than has already 
occurred. In scenario 3, the euro only appreciates slightly, while the effective appreciation of the 
Chinese yuan is 17 percent, compared with a bilateral appreciation of 41 percent against the US 
dollar. 
  Additional dollar exchange rate adjustment will be part of the global adjustment process. 
The question is, how will it unfold, in particular for those countries whose currencies are pegged or 
tightly managed against the dollar, such as the Chinese yuan? Two non-answers should be rejected. 
First, a small widening of the band of fluctuation of the yuan—for example, by plus or minus 2 
percent, with or without a move to a basket peg—will be insufficient and counterproductive. Such an 
approach is insufficient because a much larger adjustment is needed. It is counterproductive because 
a small adjustment is likely to accentuate pressures for the yuan and other currencies to appreciate 
further, increasing the risk of economic and financial disruption. Second, a free float of the yuan, at 
this point, with the People’s Bank of China pulling out of the foreign exchange market, is unrealistic 
and would likewise probably lead to violent financial market gyrations not only in China but also 
elsewhere.  
The preferred approach is the “two-stage currency reform” proposed by Goldstein and 
Lardy (2003a and 2003b): (1) an immediate substantial appreciation of the yuan by at least 10 and 
preferably 15 to 25 percent, accompanied by a move to a regime focused on a currency basket with a 
band of plus or minus 5 percent and (2) a later move to greater exchange rate flexibility and more 
open capital markets after the banking system has been further strengthened.  
However, China’s is not the only currency with a de facto or de jure tight peg to the US 
dollar or a heavily managed exchange rate, judging by the extent of foreign exchange reserve 
accumulation over the past three years (table 4). There are Malaysia, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and 
India—to name four other currencies. Recall from table 4 that China accounts for only about half 
the reserve accumulation by Asian countries, excluding Japan, over the period. Moreover, it would be 
unreasonable to expect the Korean won to appreciate as much as the Chinese yuan because although 
Korea resisted the appreciation of the won via very heavy intervention though late 2004, it has 
                                                                                                                                                 
of the total weights in the Citigroup indexes for the 26 countries. The coverage was only 76 to 81 percent 
for the euro area, Russia, and Sweden because the Federal Reserve staff’s index does not include any 
Eastern European countries, which would presumably follow the euro rather closely. For half of the 
countries, the coverage was 95 percent or more. 
  23subsequently allowed the won to appreciate significantly (table 3). What is called for is a coordinated 
and differentiated adjustment of Asian currencies. Some people call for an Asian Plaza Agreement, 
which was about floating exchange rates. What is needed is an Asian Smithsonian Agreement 
involving pegged or highly managed exchange rates. 
 
Implications of Intervention and Reserve Diversification 
 
What would be the financial consequences if those countries with currencies pegged to the dollar or 
with heavily managed exchange rate regimes were to scale back substantially their intervention or 
begin to diversify their excess dollar holdings? It is difficult to prove anything in connection with this 
highly charged topic, but several cautionary observations are in order. 
  First, foreign official assets as of the end of 2003 accounted for only 14 percent of all 
foreign assets in the United States—18 percent, excluding foreign direct investment (FDI). 
Moreover, US dollar financial liabilities—official and private—are highly substitutable in most 
portfolios. By way of illustration, note that over the 12 months through March 2005 gross foreign 
transactions in US long-term securities (notes, bonds, and equities) were $30.6 trillion and gross US 
transactions in foreign securities were $6.3 trillion, but those gross magnitudes produced a net inflow 
of only $800 billion.  
  Second, international reserve assets represented 5.5 percent of cross-border liabilities in 
2002, 6.8 percent excluding FDI.27 In today’s global financial system, international reserve holdings 
are just not that important.28 According to Bank for International Settlements (BIS) data from the 
fourth quarter of 2001 to the fourth quarter of 2004, while total foreign exchange reserves increased 
by $1,683 billion, international financial assets (international bonds and notes, international money 
market instruments, and cross-border liabilities to nonbanks) increased by $8.2 trillion—almost five 
times the increase in foreign exchange reserves. 
                                                 
27   The latest date for which comprehensive data on international investment positions are available in 
International Financial Statistics is 2002, but there is no reason to believe that, out of a total of $43.5 trillion, 
the data have changed a great deal over two years. The 2002 data covered almost 90 percent of official 
reserve holdings. China is the principal country whose holdings are excluded. Excluding US cross-border 
liabilities and US reserve assets, the reserve share increases to 6.5 percent of total liabilities and about 8 
percent of total liabilities other than FDI. 
28   The International Financial Statistics data almost certainly exaggerate the importance of reserve holdings 
because reserves are more likely to be fully reported and all other assets and liabilities are likely to be 
underreported. 
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with the financing of current account positions. In the case of the United States, it is true that in the 
first quarter of 2004, the recorded increase in official assets in the United States in effect covered the 
US current account balance.29 However, private capital inflows were 2.5 times official inflows.  
In the case of Korea, in 2004 the increase in reserve assets in the fourth quarter of 2004 was 
2.6 times Korea’s current account surplus, but in the second quarter they covered only 60 percent of 
the surplus. Korean intervention in late 2004 accommodated very large private capital inflows. One 
might even argue that the official purchases encouraged private inflows by providing a willing buyer. 
Whichever way the story is told, the purchases had little or nothing to do with the Korean current 
account surplus and even less to do with the US current account deficit; in the fourth quarter of 2004 
speculative capital inflows were betting accurately on an appreciation of the won.  
The case of Japan in 2004 is even more dramatic. In the first quarter, the increase in reserves 
was three times Japan’s current account surplus. Again, the Japanese authorities were accommodating 
very large private capital inflows. However, increases in reserves (associated with interest 
accumulation) in the remaining quarters of 2004 were less than 15 percent of the contemporaneous 
current account surpluses.  
Even for China, which recorded reserve increases of more than 10 percent of GDP in 2003 
and 2004, the quarterly pattern of those increases had little to do with the pattern of trade 
surpluses.30 In the first quarter of 2004, China recorded a trade deficit, but its reserves increased $37 
billion. In the third quarter, the increase in reserves rose to $44 billion, but China had a trade surplus 
of $24 billion. 
Finally, it is important to remember that the United States is not the only country in which 
the government or other residents issue international liabilities denominated in dollars. Total external 
sovereign debt of emerging market economies was more than $1 trillion as of the end of 2004; not all 
of that debt was denominated in US dollars, but that is precisely the point. Governments and the 
private sectors issue a great deal of external debt, and the amount of that debt denominated in dollars 
                                                 
29   The recorded increase in official assets in the United States probably does underestimate the actual increase 
because of indirect holdings of US liabilities, as described by Higgins and Klitgaard (2004) in the appendix 
to their paper. However, it is wrong to attribute the entire difference between the increase in foreign 
exchange reserves or in official dollar holdings by foreign monetary authorities and the recorded increase in 
official assets in the United States as a “discrepancy” in the US statistics on international transactions. Both 
figures are based on the concept of resident; in one case it is residents of the United States issuing claims, 
and in the other case it is residents of the rest of the world accumulating claims, which need not be dollar 
claims or claims on the United States. 
30   China does not publish quarterly data on its current account balance. 
  25can and does fluctuate. Thus, according to BIS data, at the end of 2004 total international financial 
assets were $18.6 trillion, of which 39 percent are estimated to have been denominated in dollars.31
Similarly, US investors are not the only holders of dollar-denominated assets, and the 
portfolio preferences of investors around the world can affect exchange rates and interest rates. The 
size of the US current account deficit is only one factor affecting the preferences and appetites of 
central banks and treasuries to accumulate foreign exchange reserves. 
  Turning from official intervention to the issue of reserve diversification, the reserve 
management policies of monetary authorities are an area of substantial inertia in the international 
financial system. The marginal country with small foreign exchange holdings, for example, less than 
SDR 25 billion ($39 billion as of the end of 2004) may step up the pace of its diversification, but the 
financial market implications are psychologically, rather than substantively, important because the 
amounts are likely to be small. At the end of 2004, only 18 economies held more than SDR25 billion 
in foreign exchange reserves.32
More broadly, analysts focus too much on the actions of the monetary authorities with 
respect to diversification of their foreign exchange reserves. Most of the finance ministries and 
central banks are no different, aside from their inertia, from other managers of small international 
portfolios. They are just additional actors in the arena of international finance. Moreover, private 
cross-border holdings of financial assets are at least ten times the foreign exchange holdings of the 
monetary authorities. 
  Although analysts generally make too much of the scale of foreign exchange market 
intervention and overinterpret hints that monetary authorities may be diversifying their portfolios 
away from dollar-denominated assets, this judgment is subject to two important qualifications with 
respect to large holders.33 First, in the absence of substantial foreign exchange purchases of dollar-
denominated assets—intervention—the dollar would be somewhat weaker, the US current account 
deficit would be smaller, and US interest rates would be higher. It is difficult to attach magnitudes to 
these effects, and my judgment is that they are small, but we can have some confidence in their signs.  
                                                 
31   These data do not include cross-border holdings of bonds, notes, and money market instruments issued in 
domestic markets in domestic currencies. 
32   Six were traditional industrial countries: Germany, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States. 
33   In addition to the six industrial countries listed in the previous footnote as large holders, a dozen 
developing economies are in this category: Algeria, Brazil, China, Hong Kong, India, Korea, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Russia, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. 
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portfolio balance because of transactions costs or misguided economic and financial choices, then 
relaxing that constraint so that the monetary authorities can achieve their desired equilibrium might 
cause sharp adjustments in asset prices. One could argue that the recent large accumulations of 
dollar-denominated assets by certain monetary authorities puts them out of equilibrium even as the 
accumulation contributes to other economic objectives of the countries and, as a by-product, 
facilitates the achievement of short-term equilibrium by the private sector. If the monetary 
authorities decide that they want to move toward better portfolio balance, the question is, how much 
of a price adjustment would be involved both vis-à-vis their own currencies and vis-à-vis third 
currencies? Answer: We don't know.  
One interpretation of comments out of Korea and Japan in recent months to the effect that 
those countries’ authorities are exploring the currency diversification of their reserve holdings is that 
these authorities now realize that they hold too many reserves and, in particular, too many dollar-
denominated assets. They have decided belatedly that the time has come to compensate for the 
mistakes of the past. As is emphasized by Hauner (2005), the opportunity cost of international 
reserves is an elusive concept and may be viewed from many perspectives—for example, fiscal cost, 
investment return, and capital value. In terms of capital value, a country holding dollar reserves 
suffers a capital loss if its currency appreciates relative to the dollar and an opportunity cost 
compared with an investment in, say, euro or yen if the dollar depreciates against those currencies. 
Such losses are more likely to be politically than financially embarrassing. One reason is that the 
dollar’s depreciation does not affect the purchasing power of the dollar reserves over US goods and 
services. 
It is not just the official sector that may be out of equilibrium; from a longer-term 
perspective so may be the private sector in the presence of home bias. Thus, if the adjustment 
process is smooth, it might well be that a rebalancing by the official sector will be accommodated by 
an increased demand by the non-US private sector to accumulate dollar claims, which may or may 
not be claims on the United States. 
  In the face of such risks, it would be preferable if monetary authorities, including those 
with pegged exchange rates or tightly managed exchange rate regimes, adopted a longer-term view of 
the management of their portfolios. Even if they use the dollar as their intervention currency, they 
could continuously diversify the currency denomination of their portfolios of reserve assets. This 
might affect some cross rates—for example, the euro-dollar rate or the yen-dollar rate, on the 
margin, but such effects would be preferable to market disruption associated with abrupt changes in 
positions or rumors of such changes. If the United States, euro area, and Japan were to encourage 
such behavior, the international system as a whole might be more stable. 
  27  A sensible proposal in this area would include the following elements: 
  First, as a supplement to the “Data Template on International Reserves and Financial 
Liabilities” (reserve template) of the IMF’s Special Dissemination Standard (SDDS), the major 
industrial countries should commit to providing regular information—for example, at least quarterly 
with a one month lag—on the currency composition of their foreign exchange reserves (off balance 
sheet as well as on balance sheet). At least 17 of the 48 countries that subscribe to the reserve 
template of the SDDS and have committed to supplying historical data now provide periodically 
specific information on the currency composition of their foreign exchange reserves, including 10 
industrial countries (Australia, Canada, Germany, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and 7 emerging market economies 
(Bulgaria, Hong Kong, Latvia, Lithuania, the Philippines, Romania, and the Slovak Republic).34 
Together their foreign exchange reserves were $489 billion as of the end of 2004, or 13 percent of 
the global total of $3.7 trillion.35 This is an excellent start on increased transparency. 
  Second, a standard for reserve diversification should be established. A good starting point 
would be one-third US dollar, one-third euro, and one-third yen for countries other than the United 
States, Japan, and those in the euro area. The standard for the euro area, Japan, and the United States 
should be fifty-fifty. In both cases, countries could be permitted discretion of up to, say, plus or 
minus 10 percentage points. Alternatively they could declare a different standard as long as they 
disclosed it and their compliance with it, and they committed in advance to a smooth adjustment to 
any new benchmark. Special provisions could be made for holdings of non-G3 currencies. 
  Third, Japan and the euro area should agree to an off-market transaction to swap dollars 
for euro and yen assets, respectively, to achieve the fifty-fifty standard. The United States is close to 
fifty-fifty (table 7). 
  Fourth, Japan and the euro area should agree to feed the swapped dollars into the market 
on a daily basis over a period of five years. Assuming that each holds only dollars today, which is an 
extreme and unlikely estimate, the total dollar holdings to be disposed of would be $500 billion, or 
                                                 
 
34   Full compliance with the reserve template requires the periodic disclosure of international reserves broken 
down by currencies in the SDR basket as a group (the euro, Japanese yen, UK pound, and US dollar) and 
those not in the SDR basket. Additional disclosure of the currency composition of foreign exchange 
reserves is optional. The 48 countries comply by providing historical data; an additional 13 countries 
subscribe to the SDDS and must comply with the reserve template but do not supply historical data. 
35   The 15 countries include 6 of the 18 with significant holdings of foreign exchange reserves (more than SDR 
25 billion at the end of 2004): Germany, Hong Kong, Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. The 10 industrial countries hold 24 percent of the total foreign exchange reserves of 
  28$100 billion a year, or about $400 million a day. The resulting effects on foreign exchange rates of the 
regular daily sales of $400 million are likely to be trivial in a market for which daily turnover was $1.9 
trillion, per data in April 2004.36
  Fifth, other countries should be encouraged immediately to diversify their current 
purchases according to the standard. They also should be encouraged to adjust their portfolios 
smoothly over a five-year period, following the example of Japan and the euro area. 
  This program would increase transparency and remove considerable uncertainty 
overhanging international financial markets without causing large effects on exchange rates. 
  Table 7 provides some context on the diversification of foreign exchange reserves over the 
past four years. At the end of 2004, the US dollar’s share in the reserves of the 17 countries was 50 
percent. This is substantially less than the share estimated by the IMF for 2003 (IMF 2004a, 103), 
which was 63.5 percent. This difference reflects the underrepresentation of Asian and Latin 
American countries in the data in table 7. 
  Over the past four years, the euro’s share in the foreign exchange reserves of the 15 
countries for which we have data has risen by 12 percentage points. However, the decline in the US 
dollar’s share accounts for only half increase. The yen and other currencies contribute 4 and 2 
percentage points, respectively.  
Three countries have increased the dollar’s share in their foreign exchange reserves. Canada, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania have substantially reduced the dollar’s share. The declines for the 
other countries principally reflect valuation effects, as these data are value shares and the 
presumption is that most countries mark their foreign exchange holdings to market. 
Three countries have reduced the yen’s share substantially. Presumably this is a response in 
part to the low yield on yen-denominated assets. However, it also reflects relative value effects. In the 
case of the United States, the euro’s share rose by 10 percentage points since 2000, and the yen’s 
share declined by the same amount. Over the period since 2000, the United States made no 
                                                                                                                                                 
industrial countries; Japan, with 63 percent of industrial countries’ foreign exchange reserves, is the only 
major holdout. 
36   Hildebrand (2005) describes a similarly transparent program of gold sales by the Swiss National Bank, 
which appears to have had essentially no market impact. On the other hand, Blanchard, Giavazzi, and Sa 
(2005b) estimate that if China and Japan were to shift half of their foreign exchange reserves, which they 
assume are now all in US dollars, into other currencies, the dollar’s share in global portfolios would decline 
from 30 to 28 percent, which is a “substantial shift” within their framework, leading to a decline in the 
dollar possibly as large as 8.7 percent if the full adjustment was anticipated to occur over one year. Recall 
that their model is built on the assumption of imperfect asset substitution; the closer the parameterization is 
to perfect substitutability, the smaller the initial exchange rate adjustment and the more prolonged the 
adjustment process. In the limit, the model degenerates, and the speed of adjustment goes to zero. 
  29purchases of euros or yen, but it earned a higher yield on euro-denominated assets than on yen-
denominated assets, and the euro has appreciated more against the dollar than has the yen. 
 
Other Economic Policies 
 
Returning to US external adjustment, aside from official exchange rate policies and policies on 
reserve diversification, the central issue for the world economy is whether other economic and 
financial policies adjust appropriately to bring about a smooth global adjustment. As the counterpart 
to policies in the United States, policies in the rest of the world have to focus on adjusting the saving-
investment balance in the direction of increasing investment at home or reducing saving by 
increasing consumption. In addition, the growth of domestic demand has to increase relative to the 
growth of output. Starting from an assumption of an adjustment of the US external balance of a 
given size—3 percent of GDP—in the absence of compensating macroeconomic and structural 
policies to facilitate that adjustment, exchange rates will have to adjust further.37 This is the inevitable 
consequence of dealing effectively with co-dependency.  
As has been detailed frequently by organizations such as the IMF (2005), as well as by 
informed observers such as Mussa (2005), the appropriate policy choices will differ depending on the 
circumstances of the countries. Some developing countries—at least those with less total sovereign 
debt than many industrial countries and more room to maneuver monetary policy than is the case in 
Japan, for example—may find it easier to take compensating actions that boost domestic 
consumption and/or investment. The logic implicit in table 2 is that developing countries will have 
to move toward deficit if the US current account surplus is to be adjusted by $375 billion over the 
next three to five years. Seventeen of the 19 developing countries listed in table 2 had surpluses in 
2004. Yes, this implies a return to more frequent international financial crises.  
Japan and some European countries are more constrained with respect to their 
macroeconomic policies, but they can use structural policies even if they operate indirectly and more 
slowly. Other industrial countries—for example, Canada and Australia—are better positioned. 
  Outside the United States, two myths are prominent. The first myth is that the United 
States should reduce its budget deficit and this will boost national saving and narrow the US current 
                                                 
37    See footnote 24. 
  30account deficit without the need for exchange rate adjustment.38 In effect, reducing the US budget 
deficit is seen as a substitute for an exchange rate adjustment rather than as a complement. This 
prescription omits an important part of the story: the need to boost exports and slow the growth rate 
of imports, shifting demand in the United States from traded to nontraded goods and demand in the 
rest of the world in the other direction (Obstfeld and Rogoff 2004). Exchange rates are the 
preeminent device for facilitating such expenditure switching. Of course, as argued earlier, the United 
States should reduce its fiscal deficit, but that is only part of the story. 
The second myth is that the United States should slow the growth rate of the US economy 
to curb US demand for imports.39 A back of the envelope calculation suggests how unrealistic such a 
prescription is as an overall solution. The level of US real GDP would have to be lowered 9 percent 
in order to reduce imports of goods and services by, say, 2 percent of GDP.40 Moreover, even if such 
an adjustment would avoid the need for exchange rate changes, the macroeconomic effects on the 
rest of the world’s economies would be similar to the case where exchange rates adjusted except that 
those economies would not benefit from the favorable terms-of-trade effects associated with 
exchange rate appreciation. As noted earlier, the United States will have to slow the growth of 
domestic demand, but it should not put the economy into permanent recession.  
A comparable myth is prevalent in the United States, where officials focus on the so-called 
growth gap. They call for countries in the rest of the world to boost their growth rates. Again, this 
would not be unwelcome, but one can easily exaggerate the likely effects on the US trade balance. If 
other countries grew faster, US exports would expand, and the current account deficit would narrow. 
The sign is right, but a back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that the magnitude would be small. 
A permanent boost of 3 percent in the level of foreign GDP relative to its current trend (a very 
optimistic additional growth of half a percentage point a year for six years) would raise US exports of 
goods and services by about 0.3 percent of US GDP.41
                                                 
38    See Belgian Minister of Finance Reynders (2005) for an expression of this view: “A [US] fiscal tightening 
would also contribute to reducing the US current account deficit.” There is no mention of exchange rate 
adjustments. 
39   Issing (2003, 8) is an advocate of this view: “A considerably larger correction will be necessary for the 
public saving-investment balance, with the current [US] fiscal certainly not sustainable in the long run. Such 
a correction will in all likelihood imply lower growth for a long time.” Again, there is also no mention of 
exchange rates. 
40   This calculation, which ignores price effects, is based upon US 2004 nominal GDP of $11,725 billion, 
imports of goods and services of $1,750 billion, and an income elasticity of 1.7. 
41   This calculation is based on 2004 exports of goods and services of $1,150 billion and an income elasticity of 
1.0, again ignoring price effects. 
  31These myths are not new to discussions of US external adjustment. James Tobin (1987), 
speaking just as the last US external adjustment was finally getting under way, identified eight such 
myths, including the two identified above. His final myth was that changes in exchange rates alone 
would not bring about the necessary adjustment. He argued that policy coordination should not 
focus exclusively on G-7 exchange rates. He concluded, “Meaningful policy coordination is a good 
idea. But it is tougher to achieve than stabilizing exchange rates for a while [referring to the lapsed 
Louvre Accord]. The major countries need to agree on fiscal and monetary policies that promote 
prosperity and growth of the world economy, less developed as well as developed, while gradually 
correcting the imbalances that have arisen among themselves and with the third world.”  
James Tobin was sometimes critical of Paul Volcker’s policies and policy prescriptions, but 
Tobin’s conclusion in 1987 fits with Volcker’s (2005b) about the situation today: “The clear lesson I 
draw is that there is a high premium on doing what we can to minimize the risks and to ensure that 
there is time for orderly adjustment. I well know we can’t do it all alone. But I also know we are the 
major actor—the necessary solid fulcrum for the world economy. . . . What I am talking about really 
boils down to the oldest lesson of economic policy: a strong sense of monetary and fiscal discipline.” 




The evidence is scant that policymakers either in the United States or in the rest of the world are 
preparing for a substantial adjustment in the US current account deficit. Instead, one finds in the 
United States something between complacency and denial, and in the rest of the world finger 
pointing and hand wringing.  
Policymakers in the United States and the rest of the world would be well advised to design 
their policies on the assumption that over the next three to five years the US current account deficit 
will narrow to about 3 percent of GDP. 
  As part of this adjustment, the growth of US domestic demand will slow by at least a 
percentage point from its recent rate and probably much more. Most US consumers will feel this 
effect. They will also suffer a substantial terms-of-trade loss.  
If not handled properly, the actual and potential growth of US output (real GDP) will also 
slow. Decisive action on the US budget deficit is required sooner rather than later. The Federal 
Reserve should act through word and deed to slow the growth of domestic demand. 
  The adjustment process will be more diffused in the rest of the world but will not be 
painless. The global economy will not only lose the growth stimulus that the US economy has been 
supplying for more than a decade, but that stimulus will be reversed. Consequently, policymakers in 
  32the rest of the world are also in denial. In the absence of symmetrical accommodative policies in the 
rest of the world, the economic, financial, and political costs of global adjustment will be larger.  
  Looking to the future, the monetary authorities in the United States, the euro area, and 
Japan should jointly act to minimize the risks of a lack of reserve diversification. They should further 
increase the transparency about their own reserve holdings and set and implement an international 
standard for reserve diversification. 
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  36Figure 1   Real wages, net exports, and the dollar, 1981–2003 
 


























a. Real, broad, trade-weighted foreign exchange value of the US dollar, indexed to 1981  
b. Net exports of goods and services, percent of GDP.  
c.  Average hourly earnings of production or nonsupervisory workers on private nonfarm payrolls (SA),  
 expressed in deviation from mean for the entire period (1981–2004), scaled by the standard deviation for the period.  
 













  37Figure 2  US net saving and investment, 1980–2004 (percent of GDP)
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         * Net private saving minus the statistical discrepancy. 
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                 Table 1  Alternative views of US current account sustainability a
  











NIIP status quo 
 
1.5 25  0.0  Transitional 
surpluses 
 
Current account  
status quo (I) c
 
6.0           100   1.5  Narrowing trade 
deficits 
 
Current account  
status quo (II) d
 










3.0 50  0.4  __ 
 
Zero trade deficit e
 
2.2 40  0.0  __ 
 
a.  Except as noted, based on the condition that to stabilize the ratio of the negative NIIP to nominal GDP,  
the ratio of the current account deficit (the net addition to the NIIP) to GDP must equal the growth rate 
of nominal GDP times the NIIP ratio and an assumption that the trend rate of growth of US nominal GDP 
is 5 percent. 
b.   Net international investment position. 
c.  As a percent of GDP. 
d.   At $500 billion. The figures show the peak negative NIIP ratio in 2118 and the corresponding current  
account and trade deficits ratios. 
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Country/region  1999 2004 
Billions of 
dollars 
Percent of  
US deficit 
        
 United States                  –297                  –666              –369  — 
        
 Rest of the world  207  544                 337                  91 
        
 Industrial  125  218  93               25 
 Euro area    31    36    5   1 
 Canada      2    26  24   7 
Japan  115  172  57               16 
 United Kingdom  –40  –47  –8               –2 
 Australia  –22  –39               –17               –5 
Sweden     11    28  17  5 
Switzerland     29    43  13  4 
        
 Asia                  109  196  87               24 
China    16    70  54               15 
 Taiwan      8    19  11  3 
 Korea    25    27   2  1 
 Singapore   15    28  13  4 
 Hong Kong   10    16    6  2 
 India   –3       2    5  1 
Malaysia   13    16     3  1 
Thailand   12      7  –5               –1 
Philippines      7     4  –3               –1 
Indonesia     6     7    2  0 
        
 Latin America  –48  21  69               19 
 Mexico  –14  –9    5  1 
 Brazil  –25  12  37               10 
 Argentina  –12     3  15  4 
 Venezuela       2  15  12  3 
 Chile      0    1    1  0 
 Colombia       1  –1                 –2  0 
        
 All others  21                 109  88               24 
 Israel  –2    0    2  0 
 Saudi Arabia    0  49  49               13 
 Russia  22  60  37               10 
      
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook. 
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 weightf  
 Total  18     5                 100 
 Industrial 39  17  55 
 Euro area  51  24  19 
 Canada  31  26  16 
 Japan  27    2  11 
 United Kingdom  34                –1    5 
 Australia  53  33    1 
 Switzerland  44    2    1 
 Sweden  53                12    1 
      
 Asia     7  –8                   29 
 China     0              –16                   11 
 Taiwan  13  –7  3 
 Korea  31  18  4 
 Singapore  12  –7  2 
 Hong Kong     0              –16  2 
 India  12  –2  1 
 Malaysia    0               –16  2 
 Thailand  10  –2  1 
 Philippines  –6              –14  1 
 Indonesia  11   6  1 
      
 Latin America  –17  –14                  13 
Mexico  –18  –16                  10 
Brazil  –10    –5  2 
Argentina –33  –20  neg.g
Venezuela –58  –18  neg.g
Chile   18      3  neg.g
Colombia –2    –3  neg.g
      
 All others    6   –9  2 
Israel     7              –15  1 
Saudi Arabia     0              –22  1 
Russia  10     9  1 
  
neg. = negligible 
 
a.  Percent changes are from February 2002 to March 2005, unless otherwise noted. 
b.  Monthly average bilateral exchange rates. 
c.  Exchange rates for Philippines, Indonesia, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Israel, and Saudi Arabia figures 
are from International Financial Statistics for February 2005.  
d.  Citigroup’s monthly Competitive Trade-weighted Exchange Rate Indices (CTERI). 
e.  For Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and Russia, January 2005.  
f.  Weights used for the Federal Reserve Board staff’s trade-weighted foreign exchange value of the US 
dollar, updated as of February 3, 2005. 
g.  Argentina 0.4, Venezuela 0.3, Chile 0.5, and Colombia 0.4. 
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Table 4   Foreign exchange reserves  (billions of US dollars) 
 
 





 Country/region  2001 2004 2001–04 




                 
          
Total               1,685  3,105        1,417           100   84 
               
Industrial  718  1,182 464              33   65 
Euro area  208     179 –29              –2                –14 
Canada    30       30      0   0                     0 
Japan  388     824 437              31                112 
United Kingdom   32       39     8   1   22 
Australia    16       34   17   1                113 
Sweden    13       21    8   1   62 
Switzerland    30      54   23   2   80 
               
Asia  770  1,572 801             57                104 
China  212     610 398             28                188 
Taiwan  122     242 120  8  98 
Korea  102     198  96  7  94 
Singapore    75     112  37  3  49 
Hong Kong  111     124  12  1  12 
India    45     125  80  6                178 
Malaysia    30       65  36  3                117 
Thailand    32       49  16  1  53 
Philippines    13       13  –1  0    0 
Indonesia    27       35    8  1  30 
               
Latin America                 128   180  51  4  41 
Mexico  44     63  18  1  43 
Brazil  36    53  17  1  47 
Argentina  15    18    3  0   20 
Venezuela    9    18   9  1                100 
Chile  14    16    1  0  14 
Colombia  10    13    3  0  30 
               
All others  70     171           101  7  144 
Israel  23    27    3  0    17 
Saudi Arabia  15    23    8  1    53 
Russia  33     121             88  6  267 
                 
 
 















Table 5   Scenarios for a 20 percent dollar depreciationa 
        









        
 Euro area  84 42 20 19 
 Canada  25  25  20  16 
 Japan  25  25  20  11 
 United Kingdom  25  25  20    5 
 Australia  25  25  20    1 
        
 Other industrial  25  25  20    3 
        
 Asia    0  20  41  29 
        
 Latin America    0  15  15  13 
        
 Others    0  15  15    2 
        
 Total  25  25  25               100 
        
 
a.  A 20 percent depreciation in the dollar corresponds to a 25 percent appreciation of other 
currencies against the dollar.  
b.  Weights used for the Federal Reserve Board staff’s trade-weighted foreign exchange 
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     Table 6    Impact of a 20 percent dollar depreciation on nominal  














       
Industrial   31            13   4            55 
Euro area   68            21             1            19 
Canada   19            18           13            16 
Japan   15              6           –2            11 
United Kingdom              –11            –3    1              5 
Australia     9              4           –3              1 
Switzerland            –14            –4    1              1 
Sweden            –12            –4    1              1 
        
Asia  –11  1  15            29 
China  –12  1  17            11 
Taiwan  –10  1  14              3 
Korea  –10  1  16              4 
Singapore  –10  0  13              2 
Hong Kong    –7  0    8              2 
India  –15             –1  17              1 
Malaysia  –10  1  15              2 
Thailand  –12  0  15              1 
Philippines  –10  2  15              1 
Indonesia  –12  0  14              1 
        
Latin America    –7    6    7            13 
Mexico    –5    9    9            10 
Brazil  –15  –3    0              2 
Argentina  –12  –3  –2              0 
Venezuela    –7    7    8              0 
Chile  –13  –3  –3              0 
Colombia  –11    2    4              0 
        
All others  –20   –6  –3              2 
Israel  –18   –3    0              1 
Saudi Arabia  –15   –4  –5              1 
Russia  –28  –11  –5              1 
              
Total   25    25  25         100 
        
 
a.   Calculations based on the 26 currencies in the Federal Reserve Board staff’s 
broad trade-weighted index of the foreign exchange value of the US dollar, 
using normalized weights from Citigroup’s CTERI. Subtotals use Federal 
Reserve trade weights. 
b.  See table 5.  
c.   Weights used for the Federal Reserve Board staff’s trade-weighted foreign   
exchange value of the US dollar, updated as of February 3, 2005.   45
 
  
Table 7    Evidence on foreign exchange reserves diversification 
 
  US dollar  Euro  Yen  Other currencies 

















                     
     Australia  45    5  45  15          10  –20  0  0 
 New Zealand  57    4  43  26   0  –31  1  1 
 Hong Konga 79    11  11  –1   2    –3  9           –8 
 Philippines  83   –9  10    9   4    –1  4  2 
 Canadab 48  –27  49  27   4      0  0  0 
 Norway  35    14  43            –3   6    –6         16  1 
 Switzerland  34    –7  48    3   0    –3         19  7 
 United Kingdom  30    –6  55  17          15  –12  0  0 
 Latvia  38  –16  59  27  3    –2  0           –9 
 Lithuaniac   4  –78  96  80  0    –1  0           –1 
 Slovak Republic  22      0  78    3  0    –3  0  0 
 Romaniac 36           –37  59  35  0      0  5  2 
 Bulgariac   7      0  92  –2  0     0  2  1 
 Germany  98   –1    0    0  2      1  0  0 
 United States    0      0  57  10          43  –10  0  0 
                       
    Subtotal  51   –6  35  12  7   –4  6  –2 
                       
 Swedend 37 n.a.  37 n.a.  8  n.a.  18  n.a. 
 Icelandd 40 n.a.  40 n.a.  5  n.a.  15  n.a. 
               n.a.     n.a. 
 Total  50  n.a.  36  n.a.  7  n.a.    7  n.a. 
                       
 
 n.a. = not available 
 
a.  Since 2003, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority has grouped yen, euro, and other European currencies together into one 
category as “non-US dollar bloc.” The 2003–04 yen and euro shares in this table are derived by assuming that they remain 
the same as in 2002 in the “non-US dollar bloc,” which has decreased as a share of the total since that time. 
b.  Canada holds only three currencies as foreign exchange reserves: US dollar, yen, and euro. Prior to 2003, data published 
by Canada's ministry of finance only differentiate between US dollar and non-US dollar foreign exchange reserves. Hence, 
to derive the yen and euro shares for 2000–02, we assume that the yen share during the period was the same as it was in 
2003, and the rising euro share was derived as a residual. 
c.  Assumes 2004 shares are the same as in 2003. 
d.  Data available for only 2004. 
 
 
 